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It’s Not the Thought That Counts:
Pennsylvania Quietly Made Rape and
IDSI Strict Liability Crimes
Jordan E. Yatsko*
ABSTRACT
In 1982, the Pennsylvania Superior Court decided Common-
wealth v. Williams, wherein the court held that a defendant
charged with rape or involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
(IDSI) cannot use a mistake of fact defense as to the victim’s
consent.  The court relied on the reasoning that a defendant’s
mens rea is not an element of either rape or IDSI.  Section 302 of
the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, however, requires that where the
legislature has failed to expressly require a finding of mens rea in
the text of the statute, at least recklessness must be imputed to
each material element.
This Comment argues that both rape and IDSI require a
finding of mens rea, and that both offenses must then be suscepti-
ble to a mistake of fact defense.  This Comment will first examine
the development and confusion persistent in Pennsylvania case
law surrounding the relationship between “forcible compulsion”
and non-consent—both elements of rape and IDSI.  This Com-
ment will then examine the problematic consequence of failure
to make a mistake of fact defense available to defendants in light
of the Pennsylvania courts’ controversial history of holdings and
the resulting expansion of the “forcible compulsion” definition,
as well as the plain mandate of Section 302.  Finally, this Com-
ment will present support from the Pennsylvania courts’ and the
United States Supreme Court’s constitutional tradition of requir-
ing a mens rea for a finding of guilt, particularly in serious
offenses.
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, 2018.  Thank you to my parents and sister for their love and humor, and for
reminding me always of Jeremiah 29:11.  Thank you to Bruce Antkowiak and
Adam Cogan who allowed me to watch them fight for fairness and made me need
to do it, too.  Thank you.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to
change the weights and balances in the scales of justice.  The pur-
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pose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a
guilty intent is to ease the prosecution’s path to conviction, to
strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law
from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom
heretofore allowed juries.1
The above excerpt was the United States Supreme Court’s re-
sponse to a lower court’s instruction to the jury that intent is pre-
sumed by a defendant’s voluntary act.2 The Court held that
omission of an explicit mens rea element in the text of the statute in
question could not be construed to mean that no intent is required,3
absent some evidence of affirmative congressional intent to elimi-
nate the element.4  The issue of whether to instruct the jury as to
the required mens rea is not merely a question of statutory con-
struction—the Court in United States v. Morissette5 instructed that
where intent is an element, “its existence is a question of fact which
must be submitted to the jury.6
Notwithstanding the constitutional doubts raised by the failure
to require a mens rea in serious offenses,7 as well as the Penn-
sylvania Crimes Code’s8 default imposition of a mens rea for crimes
lacking an eplicit mens rea requirement,9 the Pennsylvania courts
have refused to recognize a mens rea requirement for rape and in-
voluntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI).10  As a result, the
Pennsylvania courts have made a mistake of fact defense unavaila-
ble to defendants charged with those offenses, since evidence negat-
ing mens rea is irrelevant where mens rea is not an element.11
1. United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
2. Id. at 249.
3. Id. at 263.
4. Id. at 273.
5. United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
6. Id. at 274. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.”).
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 101–9546 (2016).
9. See § 302(a), (c).
10. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(determining that a mistake of fact defense is improper in cases of rape and IDSI
on the reasoning that a defendant’s mens rea is not an element of either offense).
11. Id.  See also Commonwealth v. Callahan, No. 629 EDA 2016, 2017 Pa.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3199 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2017).  In Callahan, the defen-
dant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in eliminating the mens rea re-
quirement for rape and in failing to instruct the jury as to a mistake of fact defense.
Id. at *7-8.  The Superior Court cited Williams for the rule that “mistake of fact is
not a defense to rape,” nor is “the defendant’s state of mind.” Id. at *11 (citing
Williams, 439 A.2d 765).
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This Comment argues that both rape and IDSI require a find-
ing of mens rea, and that both offenses must then be susceptible to
a mistake of fact defense.  Part II of this Comment will identify the
inception of the Pennsylvania rule refusing defendants a mistake of
fact defense in cases of rape and IDSI.12  Part II will then track the
Pennsylvania case law underlying the confusion tied to the elements
of rape and IDSI.13  Part II will also examine the expansion of stat-
utory and common-law definitions of elements affecting the conse-
quences of failure to require a mens rea for rape and IDSI.14  Part
III will present support from the Pennsylvania Crimes Code for re-
quiring a mens rea for rape and IDSI, as well as from the Penn-
sylvania courts’ and the United States Supreme Court’s tradition of
requiring a finding of some level of intent to avoid raising constitu-
tional doubts.15
II. BACKGROUND
At the time the Superior Court decided Commonwealth v. Wil-
liams,16 “forcible compulsion” within the meaning of the rape17 and
IDSI18 statutes had not yet been statutorily defined, and the com-
mon-law supported only a “physical force” definition.19  The Wil-
liams court determined that defendants cannot use a mistake of fact
defense20 as to consent when charged with rape or IDSI.21  The
court reasoned, “[t]he crux of the offense of rape is force and lack
of victim’s consent,” and the judiciary lacks power to create a mis-
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
17. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (2016).
18. § 3123.
19. See Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (holding,
four years after Williams, that “forcible compulsion” includes force outside of
“physical force or violence” and rejecting a more limited definition that includes
only physical force); see also Rosemary J. Scalo, Note, What Does No Mean in
Pennsylvania—The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Rape and the
Effectiveness of the Legislature’s Response, 40 VILL. L. REV. 193, 227–28 (1995)
(asserting that when the legislature finally expanded the definition of “forcible
compulsion,” the statutory definition “essentially restated the definition . . . ini-
tially articulated in Commonwealth v. Rhodes.”).
20. See § 304 (allowing a mistake of fact defense).
21. Williams, 439 A.2d at 769 (“If the element of the defendant’s belief as to
the victim’s state of mind is to be established as a defense to the crime of rape then
it should be done by our legislature . . . . We refuse to create such a defense.”).
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take of fact defense to those elements.22  Thus, a defendant’s belief
as to the victim’s consent is irrelevant.23
Pursuant to Section 304 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,24
“[i]gnorance or mistake as to a matter of fact, for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse, is a defense if . . . the ignorance
or mistake negatives the intent, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or
negligence to establish a material element of the offense.”25  In es-
sence, Section 304 allows defendants to use a mistake of fact de-
fense where a defendant makes a reasonable mistake about some
circumstance or fact that negates mens rea as to an element of the
crime charged.26  If permitted, a defendant would raise a mistake of
fact defense in the case of rape, for example, where a defendant
argues that he was mistaken as to whether the victim was con-
senting, and therefore lacked the requisite mens rea to commit the
offense.  The defendant’s mistake in this example would negate the
mens rea because he lacked mens rea as to a material element—
consent—when he mistakenly believed he had it.27
For purposes of this Comment, the relevant substantive Penn-
sylvania statutes are those criminalizing rape28 and IDSI.29  Pursu-
ant to Pennsylvania’s rape statute, Section 3121 of the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code,30 “[a] person commits a felony of the first degree
when the person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant”
by either “forcible compulsion” or “[b]y threat of forcible compul-
sion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolu-
tion.”31  Pursuant to Pennsylvania’s IDSI statute, Section 3123 of
the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,32 “[a] person commits a felony of
the first degree when the person engages in deviate sexual inter-
course33 with a complainant” by either “forcible compulsion” or
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 304 (2016).
25. § 304(1).
26. See id.
27. See § 3121 (criminalizing rape); see also Part II.B (arguing that consent is
an element of rape and therefore susceptible to a mistake of fact defense).
28. § 3121.
29. § 3123.
30. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (2016).
31. § 3121(a)(1)–(2).
32. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3123 (2016).
33. See § 3101 (defining IDSI).  “Deviate sexual intercourse” is
[s]exual intercourse per os or per anus between human beings and any
form of sexual intercourse with an animal.  The term also includes pene-
tration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of another person with a
foreign object for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or
law enforcement procedures.
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“by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a
person of reasonable resolution.”34
This Part of this Comment will outline the context of the Wil-
liams decision, which made a mistake of fact defense unavailable
for rape and IDSI.35  This Part will additionally explain the inter-
play between the elements of rape and IDSI to the extent it demon-
strates that Williams was wrongly decided at the time of the
decision, and that Williams has further become increasingly ill
suited to the offenses since a critical element has been statutorily
defined.36
A. The Making of the Williams Rule and Its Lingering
Significance
The Williams court declared that a jury instruction on mistake
of fact as to consent or non-consent in rape and IDSI “is not now
and has never been the law of Pennsylvania,” because a defendant’s
mens rea is not an element of either offense.37  However, the same
court decided the question differently just two years prior in Com-
monwealth v. Carter.38  The defendant in Carter was convicted of
what was, at that time, rape of a person “so mentally deranged or
deficient that such a person is incapable of consent.”39
The provision at issue in Carter, like those at issue in Williams,
did not explicitly include a mens rea requirement within the text of
the statute.40  The Carter court, however, relied on the default cul-
pability statute, Section 302 of the Crimes Code,41 to impute a mens
rea.42  The court ruled that Section 302 required the Common-
wealth to prove that the defendant “acted at least recklessly” with
respect to each material element, including the victim’s inability to
consent because of mental deficiency.43
Id.  Deviate sexual intercourse differs from rape in that the act of rape includes
only sexual intercourse “per os or per anus,” while IDSI includes, inter alia, sexual
intercourse via genitalia as well as with any other object. See id.
34. § 3123(a)(1)–(2).
35. Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
36. See § 3101 (defining “forcible compulsion”).
37. Williams, 439 A.2d at 769.
38. Commonwealth v. Carter, 418 A.2d 537 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
39. Id. at 539 (quoting § 3121 (1982) (amended 1996)).
40. § 3121 (1982) (amended 1996); Carter, 418 A.2d at 539 (“[T]he subsection
of rape dealing with incompetents does not state that a person must ‘know’ of
victim’s condition . . . .”); see also § 3121 (criminalizing rape).
41. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302 (2016).
42. Carter, 418 A.2d at 539.
43. Id.
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Section 302(a) provides:  “[A] person is not guilty of an offense
unless he acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently,
as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the
offense.”44  Section 302(c) requires, “[w]hen the culpability suffi-
cient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed
by law, such element is established if a person acts intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.”45  Accordingly, Sec-
tion 302 as a whole requires that when a statute in the Crimes Code
does not explicitly specify the required mens rea for an offense, a
mens rea of at least recklessness must be imputed to each material
element.46  The Carter court was thereby bound to find that the trial
court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the required mens rea
for the offense.47
Interestingly, the Carter court drew a contrast between the of-
fense at issue and statutory rape,48 which does not require a mens
rea, because a separate statute49 explicitly provides that mistake is
not a defense to statutory rape.50  Thus, because neither the statute
at issue in Carter nor any other governing statute explicitly prohib-
ited a mistake of fact defense, the offense triggered the default cul-
pability provision in Section 302.51
Post-Carter, it appears that Section 302 imputes at least reck-
lessness to each material element of sexual offenses where:  (1) the
offense does not explicitly provide the required mens rea, and (2)
the offense, in its text or in another provision, does not explicitly
prohibit mistake of fact as a defense.52
The Williams court did not address the holding in Carter or the
substance of Section 302.53  Instead, the Williams court determined
that the judiciary has no power to impose a mens rea requirement
on an offense that contains no explicit statutory mens rea require-
44. § 302(a).
45. § 302(c).
46. § 302(a), (c).
47. Carter, 418 A.2d at 539–40.
48. § 3122 (repealed 1995).
49. Section 3102 provides that when “criminality of conduct depends on a
child being below the age of 14 years, it is no defense that the defendant did not
know the age of the child or reasonably believed the child to be the age of 14 years
or older.”  § 3102.  As a result, mistake as to age is not a defense to a statutory
rape charge under what was then Section 3122. See id.
50. Carter, 418 A.2d at 540; § 3122 (repealed 1995).
51. Carter, 418 A.2d at 540.
52. See id. at 539–41.
53. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(determining that the judiciary has no power to create a mistake of fact defense or
impose a mens rea requirement rather than relying on the already-existing Section
302 to impute a mens rea).
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ment.54  The court thus inexplicably ignored Section 302’s imputa-
tion of a mens rea into offenses lacking an explicit mens rea,55 and
left the matter to the legislature to write an explicit mens rea re-
quirement into the rape and IDSI statutes.56  This legislative task,
of course, is unnecessary—Section 302 specifically contemplates
that some offenses will lack an express mens rea requirement but
still require the imputation of at least recklessness.57
A recent Superior Court decision, albeit unpublished,58 illus-
trates the clash between the Carter holding and the Williams rule.59
In Commonwealth v. Hairston,60 the defendant appealed the trial
court’s refusal to instruct the jury on a mistake of fact defense for
his rape and IDSI charges.61  The Hairston court acknowledged the
Carter court’s mens rea imputation rule via Section 302, but refused
to impute a mens rea to rape and IDSI on the ground that, in “the
statutory subsections at issue in [Carter], the victim’s consent, or
lack thereof, was an element of the crime.”62  The court distin-
guished the statute at issue in Carter from rape and IDSI—“Here,
the victim’s lack of consent, or inability to consent, is not an ele-
ment of the subsections of the crimes of rape and IDSI.”63  The
Hairston court applied the Williams rule and affirmed Hairston’s
convictions without any finding of mens rea.64
This puzzling ruling relies on Williams, but on grounds that vic-
tim consent is not an element rather than that the defendant’s mens
rea is not an element.65  The Williams court refused to allow a mis-
take of fact defense related to the defendant’s mens rea on the rea-
soning that the defendant’s mens rea is not an element, and, instead,
consent is “[t]he crux” of rape and IDSI.66  The Hairston court ac-
54. Id. (“If the element of the defendant’s belief as to the victim’s state of
mind is to be established as a defense to the crime of rape then it should be done
by our legislature which has the power to define crimes and offenses.”).
55. See § 302.
56. See Williams, 439 A.2d at 769.
57. § 302(a), (c).
58. Pennsylvania Court Rules severely limit the precedential value of unpub-
lished decisions. See PA. SUPER. CT. I.O.P. § 65.37 (2016).
59. See Commonwealth v. Hairston, No. 1108 WDA 2013, 2015 Pa. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 3425 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2015).
60. Commonwealth v. Hairston, No. 1108 WDA 2013, 2015 Pa. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 3425 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2015).
61. Id. at *1, *15.
62. Id. at *55.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Compare id., with Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982).
66. Williams, 439 A.2d at 769.
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knowledged that sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, and in-
decent assault67 were outside the control of the Williams rule68
because they each have consent elements and thus could require a
mistake of fact instruction.69  As a result, the Hairston court ruled
that where consent is an element, a mistake of fact defense could be
proper.70  Consent, however, is an element of both rape and IDSI—
the Williams court itself declared this fact.71
The Hairston ruling reflects the confusion persistent in Penn-
sylvania caselaw regarding the elements of rape and IDSI, and
demonstrates the Pennsylvania courts’ nearly-unvaried, reflexive
insistence on the survival of the Williams rule without due regard to
its ill fit.
B. Interplay Between “Forcible Compulsion” and Consent
The Hairston court’s finding that consent is not an element of
rape or IDSI conflicts with Pennsylvania Superior Court and Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court precedent.72  As an initial matter, Williams
itself ruled that part of “the crux” of rape and IDSI is victim con-
sent.73  Further, Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that
“forcible compulsion” is determined by examining its effect on con-
sent.74  Put another way, “forcible compulsion” does not replace the
consent element, but is instead determined by its effect on
consent.75
1. The “Forcible Compulsion” Inquiry Is a Non-Consent Inquiry
In 1986, just four years post-Williams, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, in Commonwealth v. Rhodes,76 judicially expanded
the definition of “forcible compulsion” within the meaning of both
the rape and IDSI statutes, reasoning that the “forcible compul-
67. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3124.1, 3125, 3126 (2016).
68. See Williams, 439 A.2d at 769.  The Williams court held that a mistake of
fact defense as to the victim’s consent is improper for rape and IDSI charges be-
cause the defendant’s mens rea is not an element of rape or IDSI. Id.
69. Hairston, 2015 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3425, at *55-56.
70. See id.
71. See infra Part II.B.1–2 (explaining that consent is an element of both rape
and IDSI); see also Williams, 439 A.2d at 769 (ruling that consent is part of “[t]he
crux” of rape and IDSI).
72. See infra Part II.B.1–2; see also Williams, 439 A.2d at 769 (ruling that con-
sent is part of “[t]he crux” of rape and IDSI).
73. Williams, 439 A.2d at 769.
74. See Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (relying on
Commonwealth v. Irvin, 393 A.2d 1042, 1044 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)).
75. See id. (relying on Irvin, 393 A.2d at 1044).
76. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986).
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sion” inquiry is a non-consent inquiry.77  In other words, “forcible
compulsion” is determined by the effect the force has on consent.78
As a result, “consent . . . will negate a finding of forcible
compulsion.”79
The Rhodes court held that “forcible compulsion” includes not
only physical force, to which the term had previously been limited,
“but also moral, psychological or intellectual force used to compel a
person to engage in sexual intercourse against that person’s will.”80
The court relied largely on the premise that the “force necessary to
support convictions for rape and [IDSI] need only be such as to
establish lack of consent.”81  The court further reasoned that “the
‘degree of force involved in rape and [IDSI] is defined, not in terms
of the physical injury to the victim, but in terms of the effect it has
on the victim’s volition.’”82  Importantly, the Rhodes court distin-
guished rape from statutory rape, an offense for which “consent is
immaterial.”83
In determining whether the defendant in Rhodes met the “for-
cible compulsion” element of rape—by either actual force or
threatened force—the court inquired into the effect the defendant’s
force had on the victim’s consent; the presence of force alone was
not enough.84  The court looked to the respective ages of the young
victim and the 20-year-old defendant, as well as the fact that the
defendant “lured” the victim and used the child’s trust that resulted
from the defendant’s three-year relationship with her family to
commit the sexual act.85
The court provided factors for determining whether “forcible
compulsion” is met, but determined that, in all cases, “the critical
circumstances and evidence here will be those which tend to prove
or disprove compulsion or lack of consent, i.e. that such force was
used to compel a person to engage in sexual intercourse against that
person’s will.”86
77. Id. at 1229.
78. Id. at 1226 (citing Irvin, 393 A.2d at 1044).
79. Id. at 1225.
80. Id. at 1226.
81. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 768 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982)).
82. Id. (quoting Irvin, 393 A.2d 1042 at 1044).
83. Id. at 1229.
84. Id. at 1227 (determining that the circumstances were such that the victim
had “no alternative but submission”).
85. Id.
86. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1227 (internal quotations omitted).
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2. Consent Is a Technical Element in Rape and IDSI
In 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revisited the rela-
tionship between consent and “forcible compulsion” in Common-
wealth v. Buffington.87  The issue in Buffington was whether sexual
assault88 is a lesser-included offense of rape and IDSI.89  The only
elements of sexual assault are “sexual intercourse or deviate sexual
intercourse” and lack of consent.90  Thus, if rape and IDSI do not
have consent as elements, then sexual assault cannot be a lesser-
included offense.91
The court determined that rape and IDSI have consent ele-
ments, though each offense “requires more.”92  The court reasoned,
“the force needs to be such as to demonstrate an absence of con-
sent” to constitute “forcible compulsion,” which, in turn, “encom-
passes a lack of consent.”93
C. New Statutory Landscape
1. “Forcible Compulsion” Statutorily Expanded
Though the Rhodes court, in 1986, extended the common-law
definition of “forcible compulsion” to include “moral, psychological
or intellectual force used to compel a person to engage in sexual
intercourse against that person’s will,”94 some uncertainty resulted
about the reach of “forcible compulsion” when the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed per curiam the Superior Court’s decision
in Commonwealth v. Mlinarich95 two years post-Rhodes.96
In Mlinarich, the Superior Court held that rape requires “ac-
tual physical compulsion or violence or a threat” thereof to consti-
tute “forcible compulsion.”97  The Mlinarich court therefore
determined that the defendant’s threat to withdraw custodial care
and return the 16-year-old victim to a juvenile detention center un-
87. Commonwealth v. Buffington, 828 A.2d 1024 (Pa. 2003).
88. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3124.1 (2016).
89. Buffington, 828 A.2d at 1028.
90. Id. at 1027–28 (citing § 3124.1).
91. Id. at 1031.
92. Id. at 1032.
93. Id. at 1031.
94. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986).
95. Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), aff’d per
curiam, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988).
96. See Commonwealth v. Dorman, 547 A.2d 757, 760 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(“[S]ome uncertainty was cast upon [the Rhodes] proposition when the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court . . . considered the question.”).
97. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 403.
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less she assented to sexual intercourse could not be “forcible
compulsion.”98
Six years later, in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz,99 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court again refused a finding of “forcible com-
pulsion”; the court used the definition as specified by Rhodes, but
demanded a stringent showing of “forcible compulsion” in its re-
view of the victim’s testimony.100  The victim in Berkowitz testified,
“[i]t’s possible” that she took no steps during the sexual encounter
to discourage the defendant or leave, and that the defendant did
not physically restrain or threaten her.101  The victim did, however,
say “‘no’ throughout the encounter.”102  The court determined that
the victim’s repeated “no” “would be relevant to the issue of con-
sent, [but] it is not relevant to the issue of force.”103  The court rea-
soned that “forcible compulsion” requires “something more than a
lack of consent,” and the record therefore did not support a finding
of force.104  As a result, the court affirmed the Superior Court’s re-
versal of the defendant’s rape conviction because of insufficiency of
evidence regarding the “forcible compulsion” element.105
Post-Berkowitz and post-Mlinarich, the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture statutorily defined “forcible compulsion”—an expansion that
some attribute to the controversial holdings in those cases.106  The
legislature extended “forcible compulsion” to include “physical, in-
tellectual, moral, emotional or psychological force, either express or
implied,”107 which essentially adopts the common-law definition
created by Rhodes.108
98. Id.
99. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).




104. Id. at 1165.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives
What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 742 (2010)
(“The Pennsylvania legislature responded to this controversy exactly as one might
predict:  by ducking it. . . . One could view these changes as effectively overruling
Berkowitz. . . . Alternatively, one could view the legislation as effectively codifying
Berkowitz.”); Scalo, supra note 19, at 216–17 (“Following the Berkowitz decision
and the public controversy that followed its release, the Pennsylvania legislature
focused its attention on rape reform.”).
107. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3101 (2016).
108. See Scalo, supra note 19, at 227–28 (asserting that when the legislature
finally expanded the definition of “forcible compulsion,” the statutory definition
“essentially restated the definition . . . initially articulated in Commonwealth v.
Rhodes”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\122-3\DIK304.txt unknown Seq: 13 25-JUN-18 11:52
2018] RAPE AND IDSI STRICT LIABILITY CRIMES 1009
2. Fischer Concerns for the Viability of Williams
Despite the tumult of the changing common-law definition of
“forcible compulsion” and the inception of its more expansive stat-
utory definition, the courts remain tied to the Williams rule making
a mistake of fact defense unavailable to defendants in cases of rape
and IDSI.  Just a single showing of hesitation appeared in 1998.109
The Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Fischer110 acknowl-
edged the ill fit of the Williams rule in some circumstances after
“forcible compulsion” was statutorily defined and thereby ex-
panded to include “compulsion by use of physical, intellectual,
moral, emotional or psychological force, either express or im-
plied.”111  In Fischer, the defendant raised an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim for his trial attorney’s failure to request a jury
charge on mistake of fact as to consent.112  As a result, the court
had to determine first if the request “would have been
successful.”113
The defendant and victim in Fischer both testified that two sex-
ual encounters occurred on the evening in question.114  The defen-
dant in Fischer testified that he and the victim engaged in “rough
sex” in the first encounter, wherein the “victim acted aggres-
sively.”115  The defendant testified that during the second encoun-
ter, he was only mimicking the victim’s behavior in the first
encounter by, inter alia, holding the victim’s arms above her
head.116  The victim testified that the second encounter was
nonconsensual.117
109. See Commonwealth v. Fischer, 721 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
110. Commonwealth v. Fischer, 721 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
111. § 3101 (defining “forcible compulsion”); Fischer, 721 A.2d at 1118.  The
Fischer court noted the Pennsylvania Criminal Jury Instructions Subcommittee’s
concerns about the application of Williams in “the ever-changing law of sexual
assault.” Fischer, 721 A.2d at 1118.  The court “agree[d] with the Subcommittee
that the rule in Williams is inappropriate in . . . date rape case[s].” Id.
112. Fischer, 721 A.2d at 1113 (“[A]ppellant claims that counsel should have
asked the court to instruct the jurors that if they found appellant reasonably,
though mistakenly, believed that the victim was consenting to his sexual advances,
they could find him not guilty.”).
113. Id. at 1114.
114. Id. at 1112.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1113.  The defendant testified that during the first encounter, which
he mimicked in the second encounter, “the victim acted aggressively . . . by holding
[the defendant’s] arms above his head, biting his chest, stating ‘[y]ou know you
want me,’ and initiating oral sex.” Id. at 1112.
117. Id. at 1112–13.  The victim testified that the defendant told her,
“[n]obody will know where you are” as he tried to engage in sexual acts with her,
as well as that the defendant blocked her path when she tried to leave. Id.
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The Fischer court expressed reservations about the Williams
rule denying defendants a mistake of fact defense as to victim con-
sent in rape and IDSI cases.118  The court recognized that the ex-
pansion of “forcible compulsion” to include force other than
physical force post-Williams makes room for cases where the Wil-
liams rule is “inappropriate.”119  The court elucidated its conclu-
sion:  “[T]he rule in Williams is inappropriate” where the defendant
and victim experience a “mutual misunderstanding”—that is, where
the defendant reasonably, but mistakenly, believes the victim con-
sents, and the victim mistakenly fears that resistance will trigger vi-
olence and thus “feigns willingness, even some pleasure.”120
Nonetheless, the Fischer court reluctantly declined to overrule
Williams because the defendant’s conduct in Fischer involved physi-
cal force, rather than “one of the ‘new’ varieties” of force recently
added to the definition of “forcible compulsion.”121  The court ulti-
mately bound itself to Williams because, despite being “keenly
aware” of the circumstances that could make the conduct in Fischer
more susceptible to a mistake of fact, Williams was based on the
reasoning that, categorically, “the law did not require” the defense,
rather than based on the particular facts present in the Williams
case.122  The Fischer court opined, “[e]ven if we were to disagree
with those conclusions, we are powerless to alter them.”123
In 1999, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to
determine whether the Superior Court erred in its ruling regarding
counsel’s failure to request a mistake of fact instruction in
Fischer,124 but thereafter, without explanation, dismissed the appeal
as having been improvidently granted.125
118. Id. at 1118.  The court stated:
Changing codes of sexual conduct, particularly those exhibited on college
campuses, may require that we give greater weight to what is occurring
beneath the overt actions of young men and women.  Recognition of
those changes, in the form of specified jury instructions, strikes us as an
appropriate course of action.
Id.
119. Id.  In addition, the court acknowledged persuasive precedent from other
jurisdictions that permit jury instructions on mistake of fact. Id. at 1117 (citing In
the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279 (N.J. 1992); State v. Smith, 554 A.2d
713 (Conn. 1989); People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975)).
120. Id. at 1117–18 (agreeing with the Pennsylvania Criminal Jury Instruc-
tions Subcommittee that “the defendant in such a case ought not to be convicted of
rape”).
121. Id. at 1118.
122. Fischer, 721 A.2d at 1118.
123. Id.
124. Commonwealth v. Fischer, 730 A.2d 485 (Pa. 1999).
125. Commonwealth v. Fischer, 745 A.2d 1214 (Pa. 2000).
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3. The Disappearance of Fischer
Since Fischer, the Pennsylvania courts have shown little, if any,
reluctance to discard the Williams rule denying defendants a mis-
take of fact defense in rape and IDSI cases.  The Hairston court, for
example, clung to the Williams rule to rule that a jury instruction on
mistake of fact for “sexual assault cases” is improper.126  The Hair-
ston court did acknowledge the Fischer court’s reservations about
the viability of the Williams rule, but focused on the Fischer court’s
ultimate determination that Williams must stand.127
In Commonwealth v. Callahan,128 the defendant argued on ap-
peal that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the
required mens rea and mistake of fact defense.129  The Superior
Court briefly disposed of this claim by stating, simply, “this Court
has long held that mistake of fact is not a defense to rape.”130
To be sure, both Hairston and Callahan involved physical force
instead of one of the “new varieties” of force (psychological, for
example), which the Fischer court indicated makes for a tougher
case to refuse the Williams rule.131  The type of force used, how-
ever, does not override the mandate of Section 302’s imputation of
a mens rea, which, in the cases of rape and IDSI, automatically trig-
gers the availability of a mistake of fact defense by statute.132
126. Commonwealth v. Hairston, No. 1108 WDA 2013, 2015 Pa. Super. Un-
pub. LEXIS 3425, at *54 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2015).  The court did, however,
appear to be willing to allow a mistake of fact defense for some “sexual assault”
offenses (not including rape or IDSI). See id. at *55–56.
127. Id. at *53.
128. Commonwealth v. Callahan, No. 629 EDA 2016, 2017 Pa. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 3199 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
129. Id. at *9.  The defendant argued that the jury should have been in-
structed on mistake of fact for his “forcible compulsion” crimes (specifically, rape
and aggravated indecent assault by forcible compulsion). Id.
130. Id. at *11 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1982)).
131. See Hairston, 2015 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3425, at *3 (determining
whether a mistake of fact defense was proper where the defendant’s rape and IDSI
convictions stemmed from sexual abuse achieved by physical threats); Callahan,
2017 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3199, at *2–3 (recounting the victim’s testimony
wherein she alleged the defendant used physical force, including punching her);
Commonwealth v. Fischer, 721 A.2d 1111, 1118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (finding that
“Williams controls” in the “case of a young woman alleging physical force in a
sexual assault and a young man claiming that he reasonably believed he had
consent”).
132. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302(a), (c) (2016) (imputing at least recklessness to
offenses lacking an explicit mens rea requirement); § 304(1) (permitting a mistake
of fact defense where “ignorance or mistake negatives” the mens rea required).
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III. ANALYSIS
The issue with the Pennsylvania courts’ refusal to require a
mens rea for rape and IDSI extends beyond the fairness concerns
expressed by the Superior Court in Fischer.133  The Williams rule
denying mens rea requirements for rape and IDSI plainly violates
both Section 302 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code134 and defend-
ants’ due process right to be free from prosecution under statutes
that criminalize a broad range of innocent conduct, as well as the
right to have each element of the crime charged submitted to the
jury.135
A. Section 302 Imputes a Mens Rea to Rape and IDSI
Pursuant to Section 302 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, “a
person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with
respect to each material element of the offense.”136  When the sub-
stantive provision does not contain a mens rea element as required
by that language, “such element is established if a person acts inten-
tionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.”137  Thus,
each offense, save two exceptions, requires a mens rea even when
the provision does not explicitly require a mens rea.138  Where the
substantive offense provision does not explicitly require a mens rea,
Section 302(c) imputes at least recklessness to each material
element.139
Section 302 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code does not impute
a mens rea to substantive offenses indiscriminately.140  Section
305141 provides that the culpability requirements imposed by Sec-
tion 302 generally do not apply to “summary offenses”142 or to strict
liability offenses “in so far as a legislative purpose to impose abso-
133. See Fischer, 721 A.2d at 1117–18.
134. See infra Part III.A.
135. See infra Part III.B.
136. § 302(a).
137. § 302(c).
138. § 302(a).  Exceptions to this provision are listed in Section 305 and in-
clude summary offenses and offenses for which a legislative intent to impose strict
liability is plain. See § 305(a).
139. § 302(c).
140. See § 305(a).
141. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305 (2016).
142. § 305(a)(1) (providing that the Section 302 culpability requirements are
inapplicable to “summary offenses, unless the requirement involved is included in
the definition of the offense or the court determines that its application is consis-
tent with effective enforcement of the law defining the offense”).
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lute liability for such offenses or with respect to any material ele-
ment thereof plainly appears.”143
Thus, as a general rule, all offenses require a mens rea.144
When an offense does not contain an express mens rea require-
ment, at least recklessness must be imputed to all material ele-
ments145 unless the offense is a summary offense or a strict liability
offense.146
1. Neither Rape nor IDSI Are Summary Offenses
Though Section 305 provides that Section 302’s mens rea impu-
tation does not apply to summary offenses, neither rape nor IDSI
are summary offenses.147  Pursuant to Section 106(c),148 an offense
is a summary offense if “it is so designated” or “if a person con-
victed thereof may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the
maximum of which is not more than 90 days.”149  Rape and IDSI
are first-degree felonies punishable by up to 20 years’ imprison-
ment, and therefore neither rape nor IDSI qualify as summary
offenses.150
2. Neither Rape nor IDSI Can Be Strict Liability Crimes
Because strict liability offenses are “generally disfavored,” the
courts will not impose liability without a finding of culpability “ab-
sent indicia of legislative intent to dispense with a mens rea.”151
The legislature has intentionally dispensed with a mens rea require-
ment where the offense is a “public welfare” offense.152  Public wel-
fare offenses are “essentially non-criminal” offenses created “to
utilize the machinery of criminal administration as an enforcing arm





147. § 305 (providing that Section 302 does not apply to summary offenses);
§ 302(a), (c) (imputing a mens rea to offenses that do not require a mens rea in the
text of the statute); § 106 (defining “summary offense”).
148. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 106(c) (2016).
149. § 106(c)(1)–(2).
150. § 3121(a) (providing that rape is a first-degree felony); § 3123(a) (provid-
ing that IDSI is a first-degree felony); § 1103(1) (providing that first-degree felo-
nies carry a maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment).
151. Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d 1136, 1149 (Pa. 2014).
152. Id.
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totally unrelated to questions of moral wrongdoing or guilt.”153
Public welfare offenses typically carry a light penalty.154
In Commonwealth v. Moran,155 for example, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court refused to impose strict liability for a violation of
Section 4701,156 bribery, on the reasoning that “[Section] 4701 is not
a regulatory measure aimed at safeguarding the public welfare and
health, nor is its penalty light.”157  Notably, bribery is a “third de-
gree felony punishable by up to three years imprisonment.”158  The
court instead relied on the “long-standing tradition, which is re-
flected in the plain language of [Section] 302, that criminal liability
is not to be imposed absent some level of culpability.”159  As a re-
sult, the court applied Section 302’s culpability requirements to
bribery and determined that the trial court erred in refusing to in-
struct the jury as to a mens rea element.160
Following the reasoning of Moran, neither rape nor IDSI qual-
ify as a public welfare offense.  Both offenses are criminal, first-
degree felonies carrying a maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment.161
Public welfare offenses are limited to “non-criminal” offenses
where conduct is penalized merely to allow the criminal justice sys-
tem to enforce civil social regulations.162
Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acknowledged
that other sexual offenses in the same Chapter of the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code where rape is criminalized require a mens rea.163  In
Commonwealth v. Hacker,164 the court considered whether mistake
153. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 155 A.2d 825, 827–28 (Pa.
1959)).
154. Id.
155. Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d 1136 (Pa. 2014).
156. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4701 (2016).
157. Moran, 104 A.2d at 1149. See also Commonwealth v. Giordano, 121
A.3d 998, 1006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (finding that the offense of possession of a
weapon on school property, which is a misdemeanor, requires at least recklessness
under Section 302 because the offense is not a “regulatory measure or a non-crimi-
nal social regulation”).
158. Moran, 104 A.2d at 1149.
159. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 924 A.2d 636, 639 (Pa. 2007)).
160. Id. at 1150.
161. § 3121(a) (providing that rape is a first-degree felony); § 3123(a) (provid-
ing that IDSI is a first-degree felony); § 1103(1) (providing that first-degree felo-
nies carry a maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment).
162. See Moran, 104 A.3d at 1149 (“[T]his Court has recognized the legisla-
ture may create statutory offenses dispensing with a mens rea in fields that are
essentially non-criminal in order ‘to utilize the machinery of criminal administra-
tion as an enforcing arm for social regulations of a purely civil nature . . . .’” (quot-
ing Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 155 A.2d 825, 827–28 (Pa. 1959))).
163. See Commonwealth v. Hacker, 15 A.3d 333, 335–36 (Pa. 2011).
164. Commonwealth v. Hacker, 15 A.3d 333 (Pa. 2011).
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of age is a defense to solicitation related to Section 3121(c), rape of
a child.165  Section 3121(c) has only two explicit elements:  (1) “sex-
ual intercourse” and (2) “with a complainant who is less than 13
years of age.”166  The court considered only the age element but
acknowledged in dicta that “[a]s to the first element, no one argues
a conviction may be had without some level of mens rea; one must
intend to have (or cause) sexual intercourse.”167  Why a lower-
graded sexual offense would undoubtedly require a mens rea
though none exists in the statute, while rape and IDSI do not re-
quire a mens rea on the reasoning that none exists in the respective
statutes, remains a mystery.
3. Because Neither Section 302 Exception Applies, Section 302
Requires a Formal Finding of Mens Rea
The courts may be silently assuming that a defendant must
have acted with some level of intent where the defendant uses “for-
cible compulsion” as required under both the rape168 and IDSI169
provisions—and thus even where mens rea is not submitted to the
jury as an element, a court might assume that mens rea must exist
where “forcible compulsion” is met.  However, two problems re-
main:  (1) Section 302 does not make an exception to the imputa-
tion of a mens rea where a judge believes the mens rea is
obvious;170 and (2) the expanded definition of “forcible compul-
sion” since Williams makes a presumption of mens rea problematic
in terms of fairness.171
First, with respect to the possibility that courts are silently
presuming that some mens rea exists from the finding of “forcible
compulsion” alone, the Carter decision172 is instructive.  Though
“forcible compulsion” was not an element of the sexual offense at
issue in Carter, the court ruled that the trial court’s failure to in-
struct the jury as to the defendant’s mens rea “effect[ively] in-
165. Id. at 335.
166. § 3121(c); Hacker, 15 A.3d at 335–36.
167. Hacker, 15 A.3d at 336.
168. § 3121.
169. § 3123.
170. See § 302.
171. At the time of the Williams decision, the force constituting “forcible
compulsion” under rape and IDSI had to be physical force. See Commonwealth v.
Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (holding, four years after Williams, that
“forcible compulsion” includes force outside of “physical force or violence” and
rejecting a more limited definition that includes only physical force).
172. Commonwealth v. Carter, 418 A.2d 537 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).  See Part
II.A for a fuller discussion of Carter.
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structed that [the defendant’s] intent was of no consequence.”173
The resulting problem, according to the Carter court, is that despite
the fact that the evidence was sufficient to find at least recklessness,
it was for the jury alone to draw that inference.174
With respect to fairness concerns, “forcible compulsion” is de-
fined to include more than just physical force—a force more readily
susceptible to a finding of some level of intent.175  Though failure to
instruct the jury on a mens rea element is error under Section 302
regardless of the type of force alleged, the Fischer court’s concerns
are implicated most dramatically in cases where the force is “moral,
emotional or psychological force, either express or implied.”176  The
Fischer court noted that the Williams rule refusing an instruction on
mistake of fact would be “inappropriate” where the force is non-
physical:
[T]here may be cases, especially now that Rhodes has extended
the definition of force . . . where a defendant might non-reck-
lessly or even reasonably, but wrongly, believe that his words and
conduct do not constitute force or the threat of force and that a
non-resisting female is consenting.  An example might be “date
rape” resulting from mutual misunderstanding.  The boy does not
intend or suspect the intimidating potential of his vigorous woo-
ing.  The girl, misjudging the boy’s character, believes he will be-
come violent if thwarted; she feigns willingness, even some
pleasure.  In our opinion the defendant in such a case ought not
to be convicted of rape.177
However, even cases where the “force” is physical are suscepti-
ble to a mistake as to consent.  The mere use of “force” does not
transform lawful conduct into unlawful conduct:  Consent is the rel-
evant inquiry when determining whether a defendant uses “forcible
compulsion” to overcome consent.178  Thus, where a defendant’s
mens rea would negate a finding of consent, which can occur rape
173. Carter, 418 A.2d at 540.
174. Id.  A jury instruction indicating that a jury may presume a defendant’s
mens rea by the defendant’s objective act, such as “forcible compulsion,” raises a
federal constitutional issue implicating the right to have all elements submitted to
the jury. See generally Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).  This issue,
among other constitutional implications, is addressed in Part III.B.
175. § 3101 (defining “forcible compulsion” as “[c]ompulsion by use of physi-
cal, intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological force, either express or
implied”).
176. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Fischer, 721 A.2d 1111, 1118–19 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1998).
177. Fischer, 721 A.2d at 1117–18.
178. See Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (citing
Commonwealth v. Irvin, 393 A.2d 1042, 1044 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)).
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and IDSI in any case—regardless of the type of force used—the
mistake of fact defense must be available.179
B. Failure to Impute a Mens Rea Element to Rape and IDSI
Raises Constitutional Doubts
The United States Supreme Court has consistently cautioned
that “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal”180 in review of
statutory provisions omitting a mens rea requirement.181  Two prin-
ciples support the tradition of a mens rea requirement for offenses
lacking clear indicia of legislative intent to dispense with the re-
quirement:  (1) Offenses lacking a mens rea requirement risk
criminalizing a broad range of otherwise innocent conduct;182 and
(2) the fact-finder must find that each element has been proven,
meaning that mens rea cannot be presumed.183
1. The Tradition of a Mens Rea Requirement
In 1952, the Supreme Court in Morissette stated, “[t]he conten-
tion that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion.”184  By requiring
some level of mens rea for criminal offenses, courts “have sought to
protect those who were not blameworthy in mind from conviction
of infamous common-law crimes.”185  The defendant in Morissette
was convicted of stealing property from government land when he
removed shell casings from government property while hunting, be-
lieving the casings were abandoned.186  The trial court refused to
allow counsel to argue to the jury that the defendant lacked crimi-
nal intent, and instead effectively instructed the jury that his crimi-
nal intent could be presumed by his own act.187
The Court considered whether the instruction was error, and
refused to interpret the omission of an explicit mens rea require-
ment in the text of the statute as the legislature’s intent to dispense
179. See  § 305 (providing for mistake of fact defense).  No exception is made
for when “forcible compulsion” is an element. See id.
180. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
181. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“[T]his
principle is ‘as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in free-
dom of the human will . . . .’” (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250)); Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (“[T]he requirement of some mens rea for
a crime is firmly embedded.”); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.
182. See infra Part III.B.2.
183. See infra Part III.B.3.
184. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250.
185. Id. at 252.
186. Id. at 247–48.
187. Id. at 249.
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with it, lest the Court “radically . . . change the weights and bal-
ances in the scales of justice.”188  The Court thus refused to “strip
the defendant” of the presumption of innocence as to “evil pur-
pose” solely on “judicial initiative” even where Congress required
no explicit mens rea in the text of the statute.189
The Court in Morissette further considered the omission of a
mens rea requirement through the lens of tradition regarding com-
mon-law offenses.190  The Court refused to construe the omission of
an explicit mens rea element as Congress’s intention to dispense
with it on the reasoning that the offense in question was both a
common-law offense191 and an offense criminalized in a section oth-
erwise filled with offenses that did require a mens rea.192  The
Court noted:  “If one crime without intent has been smuggled into a
section whose dominant offenses do require intent, it was put in ill-
fitting and compromising company.”193  This admonition calls up
the Hacker decision,194 wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
noted that for the provision criminalizing rape of a child, which is
codified in the same title where rape and IDSI are codified, “no one
argues a conviction may be had without some level of mens rea”
notwithstanding the provision’s failure to require a mens rea explic-
itly.195  Nonetheless, the Williams rule still stands—because neither
rape nor IDSI require a mens rea in the text of the respective stat-
utes, the Williams court ruled that none is required.196
More recently, in 1994, the United States Supreme Court in
Staples v. United States197 reiterated the tradition of requiring a
mens rea.198  The Court refused to accept the statute’s silence as to
188. Id. at 263.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 254–62.  Common-law offenses are offenses “against the state, the
person, property, or public morals” and those “in the nature of positive aggres-
sions or invasions” that carry high penalties and cast “infamy” on the felon. Id. at
255, 260.
191. Id. at 261–63.
192. Id. at 267–69.
193. Id. at 269.
194. See supra Part III.A.2 for a fuller discussion of Hacker.
195. Commonwealth v. Hacker, 15 A.3d 333, 335–36 (Pa. 2011).
196. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
197. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
198. The Court considered the relevance of whether or not a defendant had
knowledge that a firearm in his possession was capable of firing automatically,
such that he must register the weapon with the National Firearms Registration. Id.
at 602–03.  At trial, the defendant testified that he did not know his rifle fired
automatically and never observed it do so, but the trial court concluded his knowl-
edge of the weapon’s physical properties was irrelevant. Id. at 603–04.
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mens rea as dispositive regarding legislative intent to dispense with
the requirement.199  Instead, the Court looked to tradition:
[W]e must construe the statute in light of the background rules of
the common law, in which the requirement of some mens rea for
a crime is firmly embedded.  As we have observed, “the existence
of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the
principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.”200
Because offenses without mens rea requirements are “disfa-
vored,” the Supreme Court has recognized such offenses only in
“limited circumstances.”201  The Court noted, “[i]t is unthinkable”
that Congress intended to impose a ten-year sentence on an individ-
ual who reasonably believed his conduct lawful.202
Fascinatingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has considered
whether the Staples line of cases requires institutional sexual assault
to have a mens rea requirement despite the element’s absence from
the text of the statute.203  In Commonwealth v. Mayfield,204 the trial
court ruled that the institutional sexual assault provision205 violated
due process because of the Staples decision requiring a mens rea
requirement in criminal statutes absent congressional intent to dis-
pose of the element.206  On review, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court determined that “[t]he trial court’s foray into a Staples analy-
sis was unnecessary” because legislative intent to impose a mens rea
is clear via Section 302 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, which
imputes at least recklessness to provisions lacking an express mens
rea requirement.207  Consequently, the Mayfield court ruled that
Section 302’s imputation of a mens rea saved the institutional sex-
ual assault provision from unconstitutionality.208
Regardless of the Pennsylvania courts’ puzzling refusal to im-
pute a mens rea into the rape and IDSI provisions via Section 302,
United States Supreme Court precedent requires that both have
mens rea elements.209
199. Id. at 605.
200. Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
436 (1978)).
201. Id. at 606–07.
202. Id. at 615 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1254 (5th
Cir. 1989)).
203. See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418, 427 (Pa. 2003).
204. Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418 (Pa. 2003).
205. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3124.2 (2016).
206. Mayfield, 832 A.2d at 426.
207. § 302; Mayfield, 832 A.2d at 427.
208. § 302; Mayfield, 832 A.2d at 427.
209. See infra Part III.B.2-3.
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2. Offenses Lacking a Mens Rea Requirement Risk Criminalizing
a Broad Range of Conduct
On a more concrete basis for requiring a mens rea than tradi-
tion, the Supreme Court has required that a mens rea requirement
be “read into” an offense because without the requirement, the of-
fense risks criminalizing innocent conduct.210  In United States v. X-
Citement Video,211 the defendants were convicted of knowingly
transporting, shipping, receiving, distributing, or reproducing a “vis-
ual depiction[ ] of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”212
The issue before the Supreme Court was which elements “know-
ingly” applies to—specifically, whether defendants must have
known the actors were minors.213
The Court first determined that the child pornography offense
could not be a public welfare offense, because individuals “do not
harbor settled expectations that the contents of magazines and film
are generally subject to stringent public regulation” and the penalty
is up to 10 years’ imprisonment.214  The Court thus imposed the
mens rea requirement on “the crucial element separating legal in-
nocence from wrongful conduct”—the age of the performers in the
material the defendants possessed215—on the reasoning that “a
statute completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of
the performers would raise serious constitutional doubts.”216
More recently, in United States v. Elonis,217 the Court reiter-
ated:  “We have repeatedly held that ‘mere omission from a crimi-
nal enactment of any mention of criminal intent’ should not be read
as dispensing with it.”218  Relying again on the principle that wrong-
doing generally requires a subjective element for guilt,219 the Court
“read into the statute ‘only that mens rea which is necessary to sep-
arate wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct.’”220
210. See United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994); Elonis v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2010 (2015).
211. United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
212. Id. at 65–66.
213. Id. at 68.
214. Id. at 71–72.
215. Id. at 72–73.
216. Id. at 78.
217. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
218. Id. at 2009 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250
(1952)).
219. Id. (“[W]rongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.” (quoting Moris-
sette, 342 U.S. at 252)).
220. Id. at 2010 (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).
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The defendant in Elonis was convicted of communicating a
threat to injure another person221 after posting threatening state-
ments on social media.222  The trial court instructed the jury that
the defendant could be found guilty if “a reasonable person would
foresee that the statement would be interpreted” as a threat,
though the defendant requested a more demanding jury instruction
requiring the government to prove he intended to communicate a
threat.223  On certiorari, the Supreme Court concluded that because
communicating something, in itself, is not wrongful, “‘the crucial
element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct’ is the
threatening nature of the communication.”224  Thus, the defendant
must have some level of mens rea that the communication contains
a threat, and the jury instruction had to reflect the same.225
The United States Supreme Court’s repeated concern for
criminalizing innocent conduct is reminiscent of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court’s concerns expressed in Fischer.226  In addition to
the grading and severe punishment for both rape and IDSI—both
first-degree felonies punishable by up to 20 years’ imprison-
ment227—the inquiry of why rape and IDSI are criminalized sup-
ports a mens rea requirement for those offenses.  For example, the
elements constituting rape are, in relevant part:  (1) sexual inter-
course and (2) “forcible compulsion,”228 the latter of which the
courts determine only by examining its effect on victim consent.229
Where consent is legitimate, the “forcible compulsion” element is
not met.230  Where the “forcible compulsion” element is not met,
the only remaining element is sexual intercourse—which is other-
wise innocent conduct.231  Even more, since the Pennsylvania legis-
lature’s expansion of the definition of “forcible compulsion,”
defendants can accomplish “forcible compulsion” without physical
contact—via “intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological force,
221. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
222. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2011 (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 73
(1994)).
225. Id.
226. See Commonwealth v. Fischer, 721 A.2d 1111, 1117–18 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998) (noting that the Williams rule would be inappropriate where the defendant
reasonably, but mistakenly, believes the victim consents, and the victim mistakenly
fears that resistance will trigger violence).
227. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1103(1), 3121, 3123 (2016).
228. § 3121(a)(1)-(2).
229. See Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986).
230. See id. See supra Part II.B for a fuller discussion of the interplay be-
tween consent and “forcible compulsion.”
231. See § 3121(a).
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either express or implied.”232  Because “forcible compulsion” does
not require physical force, proving a defendant’s mens rea is re-
quired to separate lawful sexual activity from criminal conduct.233
In Elonis, the Court reasoned that a communication itself is not
unlawful, and thus a defendant must have mens rea as to the threat-
ening nature of the communication to separate wrongful from law-
ful conduct.234  Similarly, sexual activity is not unlawful; thus, a
defendant must have mens rea as to the “forcible compulsion” used
to engage in it.235
3. Due Process Requires that Each Element Be Submitted to the
Jury Rather than Presumed by the Defendant’s Acts
Again concerned with more than breaking the tradition of
mens rea, “as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as
belief in freedom of the human will,”236 the United States Supreme
Court has taken further issue with trial courts’ failure to instruct
juries on mens rea requirements:  The fact-finder must determine if
all elements are met.237
In Sandstrom v. Montana,238 the Court ruled that mens rea
could not be presumed from a voluntary act and must be submitted
to the jury as a separate element.239  The defendant was convicted
of deliberate homicide, and the trial court instructed the jury, “the
law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary acts.”240  The Supreme Court ruled that the instruc-
tion was constitutional error because it violated the Court’s holding
in In re Winship241:  “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the ac-
cused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged.”242
232. § 3101 (defining “forcible compulsion”).
233. See id.; Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015).
234. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011.
235. See § 302 (requiring that a person act at least recklessly as to each mate-
rial element); Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (requiring a mens rea to separate innocent
from unlawful conduct).
236. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
237. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520–21  (1979); see also In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
238. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
239. Id. at 521.
240. Id. at 512–13.
241. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
242. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520–21 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).
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A jury instruction failing to properly address an element “re-
liev[es] the State of [its] burden of proof.”243  The Court deter-
mined that the presumption that the defendant had the requisite
mens rea based solely on a finding of other required elements con-
flicts with the presumption of innocence, which “extends to every
element of the crime,” and invades the province of the jury to de-
termine if every element is established.244
With respect to rape and IDSI, two problems exist with the
argument that a defendant’s mens rea may be presumed by a find-
ing that the “forcible compulsion” element is met—one practical
and one enunciated by the Supreme Court.  As a practical matter,
since the expansion of the statutory definition of “forcible compul-
sion,” a defendant’s conduct may satisfy the element without physi-
cal force245 and thus leave undisturbed the scenarios like those the
Superior Court in Fischer cautioned were suspect as to legitimate
guilt.246  Without making comment on the frequency of such scena-
rios, the Fischer court was concerned that situations can arise where
the victim mistakenly believes her explicit non-consent will cause
her harm, and the defendant “reasonably, but wrongly,” believes
the victim has consented.247  In such encounters, the defendant may
have a colorable defense that he reasonably believed the victim
consented.  A prosecutor can, notwithstanding a mistake of fact in-
struction, nonetheless prove the “forcible compulsion” element is
satisfied by testimony as to the surrounding circumstances of the
encounter.248
The second issue with presuming a mens rea by the sexual act
alone is that expressed in Sandstrom:  Defendants have the right, as
enunciated in In re Winship, to have each element submitted to the
jury for a finding beyond reasonable doubt pursuant to the Due
Process Clause, regardless of how obvious the mens rea may be
considering findings of other elements.249  Furthermore, the failure
243. Id. at 521.
244. Id. at 523 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952)).
245. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3101 (2016) (defining “forcible compulsion” as
“compulsion by use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological
force, either express or implied”).
246. See Commonwealth v. Fischer, 721 A.2d 1111, 1117–18 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998) (noting that the Williams rule would be inappropriate where the defendant
reasonably, but mistakenly, believes the victim consents, and the victim mistakenly
fears that resistance will trigger violence).
247. See id.
248. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985); see also infra Part
III.B.4.
249. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520–21; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970).
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to instruct juries on a mens rea element for rape and IDSI is even
more serious than the precise issue in Sandstrom.  In Sandstrom,
the jury was instructed that there was a “presumption” that a defen-
dant has mens rea with respect to his voluntary acts.250  For rape
and IDSI, defendants are not entitled to a mens rea instruction at
all.251
In some cases, of course, the failure to require the Common-
wealth to prove the defendant had mens rea with respect to each
material element may be found to be harmless error on appeal.252
Specifically, it may be the case in certain circumstances that consid-
ering other evidence, including evidence concerning the type of
force used to meet the “forcible compulsion” element, no reasona-
ble jury could have found that the defendant lacked the requisite
mens rea to use that force.  The Pennsylvania courts, however, cate-
gorically refuse to impute mens rea to rape and IDSI and categori-
cally refuse a mistake of fact instruction.253
Further, as noted in Part III.B.2, for offenses like rape and
IDSI, where one element stands between wrongful and innocent
conduct—“forcible compulsion,” or the inquiry into victim con-
sent254—the Supreme Court’s rulings require the a mens rea ele-
ment attach to avoid criminalizing innocent sexual conduct.255
250. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 515.
251. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
See also PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 15.3121A,
15.3123A (PA. BAR INST. 2016) (lacking any suggestion of a required mens rea for
rape or IDSI).
252. The “Sandstrom error,” or effectively instructing the jury to presume the
defendant had mens rea based on his objective acts (for example, the use of force
in the case of rape or IDSI), is subject to harmless error analysis.  Carella v. Cali-
fornia, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989).  The Supreme Court reasoned:
In many cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no
rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant act but
did not intend to cause injury. . . . In that event the erroneous instruction
is simply superfluous:  the jury has found, in Winship’s words, ‘every fact
necessary’ to establish every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.’
Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580–81  (1986)).
253. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Callahan, No. 629 EDA 2016, 2017 Pa.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3199 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2017).  In Callahan, the defen-
dant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in eliminating the mens rea re-
quirement for rape and in failing to instruct the jury as to a mistake of fact defense.
Id. at *7.  The Superior Court cited Williams for the rule that “mistake of fact is
not a defense to rape,” nor is “the defendant’s state of mind.” Id. at *11 (citing
Williams, 439 A.2d 765).
254. See Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986).  See
supra Part II.B for a discussion on the interplay between consent and “forcible
compulsion.”
255. See United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1994).
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4. Requiring a Mens Rea Is Not Unduly Burdensome
In Liparota v. United States,256 the Supreme Court again im-
posed a mens rea requirement absent an express mens rea require-
ment in the text of the statute in question.257  The Court noted that
a mens rea requirement does not require “extraordinary evidence
that would conclusively demonstrate [a defendant’s] state of mind”
or evidence the defendant knew of the particular provisions
criminalizing his conduct.258  Instead, “as in any other criminal
prosecution requiring mens rea, the government may prove by ref-
erence to facts and circumstances surrounding the case that peti-
tioner knew that his conduct was unauthorized or illegal.”259
With regard to rape and IDSI, a jury instruction regarding the
defendant’s mens rea is not unduly burdensome.  No extraordinary
evidence is required, but rather “the facts and circumstances” sur-
rounding the sexual encounter can suffice to show the defendant’s
mens rea.260  In fact, a finding of recklessness would be satisfied
where the circumstances of the encounter suggest that the defen-
dant “consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable
risk”261 that the victim did not consent; the mere risk that the victim
is not consenting satisfies the element rather than a heightened
knowledge-of-non-consent requirement.262  Without an instruction
on mens rea, however, the jury is effectively not even permitted to
consider the possibility that the defendant believed his conduct law-
ful or that he was mistaken as to the consent.263
IV. CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania courts’ refusal to recognize mens rea as a
required element of both rape and IDSI violates the express man-
date of Section 302 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code to impute a
mens rea of at least recklessness into offenses lacking an explicit
mens rea requirement in the text of the statute.264  Without a mens
rea requirement, rape and IDSI become strict liability crimes in
Pennsylvania—a category of offenses permitted only where the leg-
256. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
257. Id. at 433.
258. Id. at 434.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302(b)(3) (2016).
262. See id.
263. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 418 A.2d 537, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)
(ruling that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to the defendant’s mens
rea “effect[ively] instructed that [the defendant’s] intent was of no consequence”).
264. See supra Part III.A.
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islature has expressed affirmative intent to dispense with a mens rea
requirement.265  The Pennsylvania legislature has, however, ex-
pressed affirmative intent to require a mens rea for both rape and
IDSI via Section 302’s imputation of a mens rea for offenses lacking
an express requirement in the text of the statute.266
Because Section 302 must impute at least recklessness to each
material element of both the rape and IDSI statutes, a mistake of
fact as to consent must be made available to defendants pursuant to
the clear mandate of Section 304.267  The Williams court’s refusal to
“create” a mistake of fact defense plainly ignores the existing legis-
lative directive to allow the defense.268
Importantly, and regardless of Section 302, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a finding of mens rea is
required to avoid constitutional doubts—that the tradition of re-
quiring a guilty mind is far from a new concept, and ensures that
wrongful conduct is separated from lawful conduct.269  Further, be-
cause both rape and IDSI must require a mens rea element pursu-
ant to Section 302 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code as well as
Pennsylvania courts’ and the United States Supreme Court’s tradi-
tion of requiring consciousness of criminal conduct, defendants are
denied substantive due process without the benefit of submission of
the mens rea element to the jury.270
Any argument that a defendant necessarily had the requisite
mens rea regarding non-consent via a finding of “forcible compul-
sion” ignores the established rule that all elements be submitted to
the jury.271  The jury remains free to disbelieve the mistake or, re-
gardless of any mistake, that the defendant was nonetheless aware
of the mere risk he lacked consent.272  As the Williams rule pres-
ently functions, a jury is not permitted to even consider the possibil-
ity that, given the circumstances of the encounter, the defendant
believed his conduct lawful.273  Contrary to all controlling law
outside of Williams and its loyal-follower progeny, Pennsylvania de-
fendants tried for rape or IDSI can, have, and will be convicted
without any showing of guilty mind.274
265. See supra Part III.A.2.
266. See supra Part III.A.
267. See supra Part III.A.
268. See supra Parts II.A, III.A.
269. See supra Part III.B.1–2.
270. See supra Part III.B.3.
271. See supra Part III.B.3.
272. See supra Part III.B.4.
273. See supra Part III.B.4.
274. See supra Part III.B.
